Proofs Upper bound on
In order to focus on interesting political scenarios, we must exclude large values of according to which the government would be so attracted to its preferred policy that it would renege even if it knew that an intervention would certainly follow. The government's expected payoff payoff from reneging when = 1 is
whereas the government's expected payoff from complying is 1 − . The latter is greater as long as
Comparative statics on * and * To see that the government's equilibrium probability of defecting is decreasing in ( ) when ( ) > / , differentiate * with respect to ( ),
To see that the military's equilibrium probability of intervening is decreasing in ( ) when ( ) > / , differentiate * with respect to ( ),
Recall from the paper that the government's expected equilibrium payoff in the mixed strategy equilibrium ′ − does not depend on ( ), hence we can treat as a parameter when interpreting the above partial derivatives.
Finally, to see that the equilibrium likelihood of military intervention is increasing in the divergence of policy preferences between the government and the military, observe that only * depends on . Differentiating * with respect to , we obtain
The government's equilibrium choice of the military's resources
Recall that the government's expected payoff is
By differentiating (1) with respect to , we obtain the first-order condition
Substituting ∂ (ˆ , ) ∂ =ˆ ( +ˆ ) 2 , the first-order condition (2) becomes a quadratic equation with a unique positive root
Differentiating with respect toˆ , we obtain
Hence is is increasing in the expected value of the threatˆ , regardless of whether , such that forˆ 1 <ˆ <ˆ 2 , the government's expected payoff when = * 2 is greater than its expected payoff when = * 3 ; since is increasing inˆ , = * 2 will be unique. A numerical example 
This is an indeterminate form that can be transformed to limˆ →∞ √
; rationalizing the numerator, 
An extension: Military intervention in military dictatorships
The model in Section 3 in the paper also helps us understand the vulnerability of military dictatorships to intervention by other factions from within the military. Empirically, military dictators are more likely to be removed from office earlier than are civilian dictators and these removals are typically carried out by other professional soldiers (????).
This particular vulnerability may account for the serial correlation in the likelihood of coups in some dictatorships, as estimated by ?. In their words, "once the ice is broken, more coups follow" (?, 152).
Suppose, therefore, that instead of a civilian government, it is a military government that relies on the rest of the military for the repression of mass opposition. As in the basic model, we assume that the officers in government may differ in their preferences over policies from officers who function strictly within the military. ?, Chapter 2, ?, Chapter 2, and ? describe such differences within the Chilean, Argentine, and Brazilian military dictatorships.
However, when it comes to contracting on violence, military and civilian dictatorships differ from each other in three ways. First, military governments typically lack institutions and norms that facilitate information sharing. We may in turn expect that the policy making process will be less transparent under military than civilian dictatorships.
Formally, this corresponds to an increase in and . Second, following its intervention in politics, the military proper is less autonomous from the government and more factionalized. We may therefore expect that an intervention is more likely to fail than when the military acts as an autonomous, unified institution against a civilian government. In terms of our model, the value of ( ) declines. Third, the institutional cost of further intervention will be much smaller -essentially zero -after an initial intervention that brings the military to power and thereby diminishes its institutional integrity.
The earlier equilibrium analysis implies that two of these three factors -reduced transparency of the policy making process and greater factionalization -unambiguously exacerbate the moral hazard problem in contracting on violence and thereby raise the likelihood of subsequent military intervention. For ( ) ≥ / ,
We have seen earlier that both * and * decrease in ( ) for ( ) ≥ / . In turn, the likelihood military intervention increases after a decline in ( ). Meanwhile, the effect of the decrease in the institutional cost of intervention is more nuanced: On the one hand, it bolsters the credibility of the threat of intervention and thus reduces the temptation of the military government to renege on any policy compromise with their counterparts within the military proper,
On the other hand, intervention now occurs with a positive probability for any value of ( ). The present model therefore identifies three, key differences between civilian and military dictatorships in contracting on violence, two of which unambiguously imply that military dictatorships should be more vulnerable to military interventions than civilian ones.
Multiple Imputation
I follow ? and use the Amelia II package for R (?). This package allows for an imputation procedure that is appropriate for cross-sectional time-series data and leads to very sensible imputed values.
I properly imputed the data as follows: I used countries and years to index the cross-section and time units. I furthermore used second-order polynomials as well as lags and leads on the inequality measures; these were interacted with the the cross-section units. I transformed the inequality measures as well as ethnic fractionalization so that imputations do not fall outside the sample extremes. The remaining covariates were transformed whenever appropriate. In order to minimize the extent to which missingness in the data depends on unobservables, I included in the imputation additional variables that are potential predictors of inequality but are not relevant for the estimation in the paper.
Finally, I used a 5% ridge prior in order to improve the numerical stability of the imputations; instability may be caused by the high missingness in the inequality measures as well as the high correlation between the two measures.
The Theil statistic is available for at most 34% of the 5,393 country-years in the data. I used ?'s (?) concept of relative efficiency in order to determine the number of datasets to impute. ?, 114 shows that the efficiency of an estimate based on imputations relative to a fully efficient estimate based on an infinite number of imputations is approximately
where is the rate of missingness. 2 Given the current rate of missingness of 66%, the relative efficiency of at least 99% is obtained with 33 or more imputations. That is, estimates based on 33 or more imputed datasets will on average have standard errors that are at most 1% larger than those based on an infinite number of imputations.
The R code for the multiple imputation procedure is require(Amelia) intervention <-read.dta("to_fill_milintervention_short.dta") a.out <-amelia(intervention, m = 40, ts = "year", cs = "ccode", + polytime = 2, intercs = TRUE, empri = 0.05*nrow(intervention), + lgstc=c("ethfrac_tr", "theil_lag_tr", "SIDD2_lag_tr", "fuel_tr", + "ore_tr", "prop_dem_tr", "SIDD2_sq_lag_tr", "theil_sq_lag_tr"), + ords=c("polity","oil","war3","civilwar3","mil_entry", "mil_exit", + "mil_leader","pleader_mil"), + noms = c("hinst","region","leg_origin","cw_1"), + lags = c("SIDD2_lag_tr","SIDD2_sq_lag_tr","theil_lag_tr","theil_sq_lag_tr"), + leads = c("SIDD2_lag_tr","SIDD2_sq_lag_tr","theil_lag_tr","theil_sq_lag_tr"), + p2s = 2)
Finally, in order to avoid working with implausible imputations in the analysis, I only use data for countries which have at least one observation on inequality and do not use imputations that are further than ten years from the closest observed value. In turn, the analysis in the paper is based on a data with a rate of missingness of 44% rather than 66%.
The 40 imputations that is use in the analysis is thus very conservative.
